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The Russian Far East Then and Now
In 1989, on the eve of economic reform, the city of Khabarovsk was
a backward, colonial outpost, one of the most distant points in the
Moscow-centered allocation networks controlling access to resources in
the former Soviet Union.  A Western visitor, strolling wide, tree-lined
Karl Marx Street, could imagine that he or she had been time-warped
back to the 1940s.  There were a few autos on the streets, most of them
military jeeps.  Shelves in the government gastronome were empty except
for Bulgarian pickles and stale bread.  The local bookstore stocked rows
of handbooks on repair of diesel engines and railcar maintenance.  In the
local market, ethnic Korean farmers sold sunflower seeds, cabbage, and
small, pock-marked pears.
Eight years later, in the fall of 1997, when participants in a Gore-
Chernomyrdin Working Group meeting converged in the same city, what
was now Muraviev-Amurskiy Street had changed.  The avenue was
crowded with Japanese cars.  Shoppers wore Korean coats. Their
shopping bags were heavy with local fruits and vegetables, Finnish
cheese, and American chicken.  In the freshly-painted private shops, the2
shoppers could buy cameras from Japan, plumbing supplies from Taiwan,
and umbrellas from Hong Kong.  Although the territory had suffered a
drastic fall in official employment--industrial employment had dropped
from 178,169 in 1992 to 124,187 in 1996--shoppers appeared
prosperous.1
Just as the city's appearance had changed, similarly, the
institutional framework for using the region's natural resources had
changed as well.  Most firms had been privatized or at least
commercialized into joint stock companies with mixed public and private
ownership.  Even collective farms had been commercialized, albeit into
large units that were still under the control of the former collective farm
directors and regional authorities.
The exercise of ownership in natural resources was still under
government control.  Except for timber, which was managed by the
territorial governments, control rights were nominally in federal
government hands.  However, the centralized, hierarchical chain of
command of the pre-reform Soviet Ministry was gone.  Now, in a world
where any agency could block and none could implement, the roles of
various governmental authorities were uncertain.   The environment
seemed chaotic.
Today, in September, 1998, the optimistic mood in Khabasrovsk
has sobered in the wake of a Russian financial crisis.  The harvest and
export of timber have fallen drastically this year.   Wages are unpaid.
                                    
1  Goskomstat rossiiskoi federatsii, Khabarovskoe kraevoe upravlenie statistiki.
Statisticheskii biulletenn' itogi raboty gorodov i raionov Khabarovskogo kraia za Ianvar'-
dekabr' 1992 goda.  Khabarovsk, 1993,   Goskomstat rossiiskoi federatsii, Khabarovskoe
kraevoe komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki.  Statisticheskii biulletenn' No 14.
Chislennost' i zarabotnaia plata rabotaiushchikh ha krupnykh e srednykh
predpriiatiiakh Khabarovskogo kraia za 1996 god.  Khabarovsk, 1997.3
Many banks are closed.  Those that are open require depositors to
withdraw their dollar deposits in badly depreciated rubles.  Families have
spent their available rubles on the purchase of necessities, and they look
ahead to winter with anxiety.  Few families can hope to feed themselves
with the potatoes, tomatoes, and cucumbers from their small private
plots in the country-side.  Yet, with international payments blocked, few
trading companies can import food.  Without shipments,  Western
shipping firms are re-routing their ships away from the Russian Far East
(RFE) to Hong Kong.
During these years of reform, residents of Khabarovsk have lived
through a hyperinflation that destroyed their savings, the collapse of
federal demand for the region's military products, and a recent decline in
the demand for their raw materials in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis. Still, only now have people succumbed to a mood of panic and
hopelessness.
The long anticipated inflow of foreign investment that was to turn
the RFE into a bustling transport node and exporter to the Pacific never
appeared, as investors confronted an uncertain economic and political
environment and obstructive regulation.
The start-up of energy projects Sakhalin-1 and 2 has had only
modest spillover to equipment producers in the region.  For example,
Amur Shipyard in Komsomolsk-na-Amure received a contract from
Sakhalin Energy Company, managed by Marathon Oil, for the $45
million mobile drilling and production unit for the Piltun-Astokhskoe
field, but Russian affiliates of Rosneft--Rosneft-Sakhalin and
Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf--were placing their equipment orders outside
the region.4
What are the economic prospects of Russia's Pacific region in the
wake of a financial crisis and a new leadership?  Russia's reform has
fallen victim to "crony" capitalism, the bizarre and corrupted institutions
that Russia's political leaders and oligarch put in place to assure
themselves control of Russian assets and resource wealth.  This
framework of financial industrial groups, hybrid state-private ownership,
influence seeking, and closed capital markets leaves decision-makers
caught in a partial and incomplete reform without benefit of legal
infrastructure or rule of law.  The uncertainty created by a system in flux
and the short time horizon of Russia's new managers has led to capital
flight of unprecedented size.  Yet, the alternative to capital flight and
brain drain seems to be administrative control of the economy by a weak
and fragmented government that has already demonstrated its lack of
accountability.
What lies ahead for the RFE region?  Without the centralized
subsidies and military demand of the Soviet era, the RFE will continue
to decline.  However, economic decline faces Moscow with political risk.
Contraction of the regional economy, out-migration of its population,
and a reduction of Russian military presence all raise fears in Moscow of
an influx of foreign population and eventual loss of control of the region.
Yet, a fragmented central government is unlikely to be able to assure
regional stability either through direct subsidy or by providing the
infrastructure for investment.
The most likely scenario for a Russia in turmoil appears to be the
continuation of a more state-centered form of crony capitalism, with
different cronies, high inflation, and increasing amounts of regulatory
control.  The institutions of crony capitalism are ideally suited to5
generate corruption, so issues of government credibility and economic
governance are likely to persist.
  Crony capitalism offers Russia two unattractive outcomes.  If the
political interests of Russia's manufacturers dominate, then Russia's
resources may be used to subsidize the large, inefficient, polluting heavy
industries, possibly with an infusion of foreign technology to upgrade
Russia's military capacity.  Alternatively, if Russia's exporters influence
policy, then Russia's raw materials will continue to be shipped abroad,
funding capital flight, but generating little income for the government
budget or the domestic economy.  In either case, Russia will have
difficulty using her resource wealth to fund market-oriented economic
growth, based on rising productivity and competition.
In this paper, we look at the way in which control of access to
resources has contributed to the emergence of crony capitalism in Russia
and in the Russian Far East.  We look, first, at the legal foundations of
access to resources and the role that privatization played in defining
these rights of newly-privatized firms.  Then we turn to case studies of
the exercise of rights to resources in fishing and forestry and in one of
Russia's northern territories, Chukotka.  The third and final section
considers the differences in resource use
that result from ownership and political access.  Ownership means
institutions that provide incentives to maximize the economic rents from
resource ownership, subject to the transactions costs of contracting and
enforcing agreement.  We argue that current arrangements for political
control of access generate signifaicant agency problems, allowing
allocators to divert benefits to themselves or to politically-favored
constituencies.  Other features of the political arrangements, including6
competition between the center and the regions for control of rents, lead
to poor information about the costs of producers and the structure of
government taxes and subsidies, short-term overharvest of resource
stocks, decapitalization of assets, and capital flight.
The Legal Framework for Access to Natural Resources
What accounts for the apparent gulf between the legal framework
for access to resources and the de facto arrangements that have emerged?
In fact, the Russian framework for management of resources provides a
very limited role for private property rights.  Moreover, there are
contradictions in the existing legislation in defining the relative roles of
various levels of government.  The ambiguities reflect the unresolved
struggle for control of resources between local, territorial, and central
government agencies.  Control of local resources and access to the profits
from their use were contentious issues between the republics and the
center when the Soviet Union dissolved.
The control of resources remains a source of conflict between
Moscow and the regions in the Russian Federation.   The fundamental
framework defining the rights of the federal and territorial levels is the
Russian Federation Treaty.
The Federation Treaty7
 The Federation Treaty, signed on 13 March 1992, delimited powers
between the Russian Federation and the republics.2  This treaty reflected
the competing claims for control over resources by assigning many of the
powers over land and natural resources to the joint jurisdiction of federal
and republican authorities.
The Russian Federation is assigned exclusive jurisdiction over the
federal  energy  system,  territorial  waters,  and  the  continental  shelf.
Utilization of natural resources and protection of the  environment  are
subject  to  joint  jurisdiction  as  is  protection  of  original  areas  of
habitation  and  traditional  ways  of  life  of  small  ethnic  communities.
Article III says, "Questions of the possession, use and disposal of land,
its mineral, water and other natural resources, are settled on the basis of
the  legislation  of  the  Russian  Federation  and  the  legislation  of  the
republics  in  the  Russian  Federation.  The  status  of  federal  natural
resources is defined by mutual accord between the federal bodies of the
Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the republics."  The
republics have all remaining state power on their territory,  other  than
those powers under the jurisdiction of the federal bodies.
The Law on Mineral Rights
                                    
2  Signatories were the Russian Federation, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Adygeya,the
Republic of Bashkortostan, the Buryat Soviet Socialist Republic, the Republic of Gornyy
Altay, the Republic of Dagestan, the Kabardin-Balkar Republic, the Republic of
Kalmykia-Khalmg Tangch, the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, the Republic of Karelia,
the Komi Soviet Socialist Republic, the Republic of Mari El, the Mordova Soviet Socialist
Republic, the North Osetian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia),
the Republic of Tuva, the Udmurt Republic, the Republic of Khakassia and the Chuvash
Republic.8
The Russian mineral rights law, Zakon O Nedrax, (literally, "Law on
Subsoil")  adopted  by  the  Russian  Parliament,  21  February  1992
established  a  State  Minerals  Fund,  Gosudarstvennyi  Fond  Nedr,  and
delineated procedures for licensing mining activities,  surveying  mineral
resources, and paying for access to mineral rights.  Administration of the
State Minerals Fund is under dual control of the central government and
territorial  officials.    But,  in  fact,  the  procedures  described  in  the
legislation  assign  most  of  the  rights  to  regulate  resource  use  to  the
central authorities.  All mineral stocks that were under the  control  of
separate  industrial  ministries  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  are  to  be
administered by the Committee on Geology and Use  of  Minerals.    The
Committee on Geology will then license rights to exploit mineral deposits
to firms and organizations. 
The  rights  of  separate  levels  of  government  are  spelled  out  in
considerable detail, with virtually all important property rights assigned
to the central government.
Central Government Rights
• develop and update legislation;
• develop procedures for payment, together with other entities; 
• develop a strategy for exploitation of mineral stocks;
• develop an integrated information data base; 
• enforce legislation regarding mineral resources;
• undertake exploration and valuation of mineral resources.
Territorial and Autonomous Republics Rights
• develop and use the territorial geological data base;9
• value local resources;
• articulate the interests of national minority groups.
Municipal and Local Rights
• participate in the  process  of  licensing  in  so  far  as  it  involves
rights to lease land;
•  develop a  raw  materials  base  for  local  firms  in  the  building
materials industry;
• license and monitor the mining of scattered resources.
Under  the  legislation  all  enterprises,  including  those  currently
engaged  in  resource  extraction,  receive licenses,  issued  jointly  by  the
Russian  Committee  on  Geology  and  Use  of  Minerals  and  by  the
authorities of the republic or territory of the Russian Federation.
Licenses  may  be  issued  by  auction  or  competitive  bidding.    A
license grants exclusive  rights  to  the  mineral  wealth  of  a  land  parcel
together with the right to manage the leased territory for a specified time
period, generally five years for exploration or twenty years for extraction.
In  the  original  legislation,  contracts  could  take  the  form  of  a
concession,  a  production  sharing  agreement,  or  a  service  contract.
Subsequently, enabling regulations have not supported genuine resource
concessions.  The high share of the lease specified for local governments
set  a  unique  precedent  in  Russian  practice.    Payment may  be  set  in
money or as a share of output, with the revenues shared among levels of
government according to the following scale:3
                                    
3  In addition, there are several taxes, discussed later.10
1)    Hydrocarbons:    federal  40  percent,  territory  30  percent,
municipal or local 30 percent;
2)  Minerals:  federal 25 percent, territory 25 percent, municipal or
local 50 percent.
In  practice,  the  contracts  negotiated  by  foreign  investors  in
Russia's  regions  show  wide  variation  in  the  manner  in  which  the
legislation was applied.
Federation Treaty •  Delineates  powers  between  the  Russian
Federation and the Republics,  initialled  on  13
March 1992 by all the republics of the Russian
Federation  except  Tatarstan  and  the  Cechen-
Ingushetia.  
•  Assigns many  of  the  powers  over  land  and
natural  resources  to  the  joint  jurisdiction  of
federal and republic authorities.  
• Questions of utilization of natural  resources
and protection of  the  environment  are  subject
to joint jurisdiction.  
• Article III gives  the  republics  power on  their
territory, other than those powers under federal
authority which are formidable.  11
Law on
Mineral Rights
•  Adopted  by  the  Russian  Parliament,  21
February  1992;    establishes  a  State  Minerals
Fund  and  describes  procedures  for  licensing
mining  activities,  surveying  mineral  resources,
and paying for access to mineral rights.  
• Fund administration is under dual control of
the central government and territorial officials,
however  most  rights  to  regulate  resource  use
remain in the hands of central authorities.   
• Licensed organizations receive exclusive rights
to the mineral wealth of a land parcel together
with the right to manage the leased territory for
a specified time period.
 
 The Policy of Reasonable Protection
The  preference  for  domestic  over  foreign  firms  reflects  the
emergence  of  a  Russian  policy  of  "reasonable  protection."    The  term
implies an explicit preference for resource development proposals that 1)
involve domestic majority control, 2) commit to substantial purchase of
domestically  produced  equipment,  and  3)  guarantee  high  levels  of
domestic  employment.    Although  each  of  these  constraints  is
understandable  in  the  current  Russian  environment,  each  makes  it
harder  for  both  foreign  and  domestic  partners  to  introduce  Western
technology and know-how and to operate efficiently in Russia.12
  For example, strict  domestic content rules are being applied to the
RFE oil and gas projects, Sakhalin -1 and -2, two of the seven projects
approved for production-sharing legislation by the Duma in 1996.  In
response to the demand that foreign oil companies contribute to
Sakhalin's infrastructure, both projects will make annual contributions
to a Sakhalin Development Fund, which will be used to provide
infrastructure investment for the island.  Each project is to pay $20
million for each of the first five years after commencement of
production.4
Sakhalin-1, begun in the Soviet era, brings together Exxon
Neftegas, the Japanese company Sodeco, and two Russian affiliates of
Rosneft--Rosneft-Sakhalin and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf.  However,
development of the Lunskoe and Piltun-Astokhskoe fields under
Sakhalin-2 was initially entrusted to a Western consortium, the MMSM
group (Marathon, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Royal Dutch/Shell), which is
managed by the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company.  In 1998, the
Russian government ordered the Ministry of Fuel and Energy to negotiate
a stake in the Sakhalin-2 project for Rosneft and its subsidiary, Rosneft-
Sakhalinmorneftegas, creating joint Russian-Western ownership in that
project as well.
Production Sharing Legislation
Many Western energy projects have been delayed awaiting
production-sharing legislation that could reduce the uncertainty
associated with changing tax and regulatory regimes.  Initial production-
                                    
4  Michael Bradshaw, "Sakhalin: the Right Place at the Right Time," Russian and Euro-
Asian Bulletin (forthcoming.)13
sharing legislation, adopted in 1995, falls short of investor's expectations
in many respects.
The Russian Federation Law on Production Sharing Agreements,
allows the federal government to enter into an agreement with an
investor granting the investor exclusive rights to prospect for and
extract mineral raw materials in the mineral resource site.5  A license is
to be issued by the appropriate regional administration and by the
federal organization for state mineral site resource management or its
territorial subdivision.  However, international contracts are subject to
parliamentary approval, a requirement that will hold projects hostage to
the vagaries of domestic politics.  Moreover, the Russian side reserves the
right to make unilateral changes in arrangements in response to changes
in world markets.  There are demanding domestic content conditions and
few safeguards for the foreign investor in the event of a dispute.
The Legal Status of Ownership of Land
The legalization of ownership of land is the single most essential
step that Russia needs in order to allow businesses to borrow against
collateral and to allow the construction of new housing that will be
required before a true inter-regional labor market and flexible labor
migration will be possible.
During the past several years, President Yeltsin has issued many
decrees to expand the exercise of property rights in land and permit its
purchase and sale.  There have also been decrees providing for
                                    
5  Russian Federation Federal Law No 225-FL on Production Sharing Agreements,
Moscow, 30 Dec 95; Passed by the State Duma on 6 Dec 95 and Approved by the
Federation Council on19 Dec 95   (Cited in Rossiiskiaya Gazeta, 11 January 1996, pp. 3-
4.14
government valuation of land and the imposition of land-use taxes, or
leasehold fees, on land.  However, in response, the Duma has passed
subsequent legislation restricting the property rights implied in the
Presidential Decrees.
In June, 1997, the Duma passed a draft law on the state
registration of  rights to real estate which covers buildings and
structures, the parcels of land associated with them as well as land
sections which are unoccupied by structures.  This legislation provides,
besides the ownership right, the right to life-time inherited ownership
and the right to permanent (indefinite) use of land sections, and the
right to economic management of property.6  Nevertheless, in the fall of
1998, full ownership rights to agricultural and urban land have yet to
pass both houses of parliament.
Immediately after economic reform, regional governments expanded
the sale to households of personal auxiliary smallholdings (household
private plots, dacha plots, and other garden plots), usually less than one
hectare in size.7
More extensive land privatization has taken the form of issuance
of "land shares."  Today, approximately 60 percent of all agricultural land
has been privatized, mainly through the issuance of land shares.  Land
shares represent an undemarcated share of land on the territory of an
agricultural enterprise where the holder works.  The size of land share is
usually set by norms established in the relevant region.
                                    
6  "On the State Registration of Rights to Real Estate and Transactions with It" has
been proposed by State Duma deputies. The committee responsible is the State Duma's
Committee on Property, Privatization and Economic Activity.  The draft, reworked by the
conciliatory commission, was passed by the parliament's lower chamber at third reading
on June 17, 1997. (Cited in Moscow Interfax, Business Law Review, July, 1997.)
7  Presidential Decree No. 337, "On Citizens' Constitutional Rights to Land" (7 March,
1996), section 2 increases the maximum size of land plots above this limit.15
Beginning in 1996, the territorial Committees for Land Resources
and Land Tenure in Amur oblast and Khabarovskiy krai issued and
distributed land shares to most farm residents.  Primorskii krai
distributed land shares to about one-third of those entitled to them.8
A detailed study of land rights and land use in the RFE by the
Rural Development Institute found significant shortcomings in this
"privatization" program.  Peasants or farmers who remained in large
collective farms enjoyed little or no ability to influence the decisions of
farm managers.  Often they were subject to intense pressure to give their
land shares to farm managers in exchange for a promise of guaranteed
subsistence.  When legal specialists, Bradley Rorem and Renee Giovarelli
visited the RFE in 1997, the found that  many households had already
turned their land shares over to farm managers.
A portion of all the regional farm land was placed in a regional
(raion) land redistribution fund.  A portion of this land is distributed to
citizens who want to establish peasant farms.  Families who wanted to
set up separate small farms were allowed to purchase land from the
redistribution fund.  However, after the fact, their ownership rights were
relatively insecure.  Property taxes charged by the raion frequently
exceeded farm value added.  Further, local officials in Russia have the
power to fine landholders for "irrational" use of land or for non-use.  So,
in years of poor weather or low food prices when households failed to use
the land for production, local officials withdrew the land from the
household without compensation.9  Thus, households preferred to farm
                                    
8  Bradley Rorem and Renee Giovarelli.  Agrarian Reform in the Russian Far East.
Report on Fieldwork Condicted in the Russian Far East.  RDI Report, October, 1997.  The
subsequent discussion makes use of this valuable report.
9  Ibid., p. 23.          16
on leased land, escaping the most burdensome of the government
regulations.
In sum, then, the legal framework for access to resources leaves
most of the control rights and many of the cash flow rights to resources
in the hands of government administrators at various levels of
government.  There are many regulatory restrictions, in addition to
environmental safeguards, and few safeguards placed on terms of access
of a leaseholder.  Thus, there is little or no limit to the discretion
afforded a governmental allocator.  The emergence of corruption as the
primary allocation mechanism follows from the failure of the Russian
government to establish genuine private property rights and its inability
to enforce even minimal accountability over the performance of
government administrators who are exercising public ownership rights.
Privatization
Economists consider property rights an essential part of the
institutional infrastructure of an economy.  If we mean by property rights
the rules of the game defining the forms that competition for resources
may take in a society, then property rights are defined by formal laws,
administrative practices, taxes, and informal custom.  In Western
practice, private ownership of an asset is associated with two types of
rights, called control rights and cash flow rights by Maxim Boycko,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny in the book, Privatizing Russia.10
                                    
10  Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.  Privatizing Russia.  Cambridge:
The MIT Press,  1995.17
Control rights are the rights to allocate property among uses, to exclude
others from its use, and to transfer it to another.  Cash flow rights are
the rights to enjoy income or benefit from its use.
Private property rights provide incentives to create wealth and to use it
efficiently because they internalize the benefits and costs of the owner's
actions on to the owner.
To the economist, it is not the formal, legal ownership rights that
determine people's behavior.  Rather, it is the de facto rights that people
face that provide incentives.  The de facto rights to resources take into
account the transactions costs of exercising ownership--costs of gaining
information and enforcing agreement--as well as legal rules.
When the protection of property is costly, then individual
incentives to produce and hold assets are reduced.  Therefore, a society's
wealth will be higher when property rights and clearly defined and
enforced.  If property rights are lacking, then individuals will have an
incentive to spend real resources to capture ownership.  With fuzzy
property rights, individuals must divide their resources between
producing wealth, capturing wealth, and protecting wealth, so lack of
clear property rights will divert effort away from production toward the
capture of wealth.
  Private owners who expect to receive the gains from moving
resources to higher value uses will have incentives to create institutional
arrangements supporting such transactions.  So resource owners have
incentives to create market institutions.  Moreover, if individuals have
differences in their initial endowments and tastes for risk, then they will
have incentives to establish institutional arrangements that allow them
to partition property rights in a variety of different ways.  So, if there are18
institutions to enforce contracts, then  individuals will select among a
wide variety of contractual arrangements in order to reduce the sum of
production and transactions costs within the existing rules of the game.
In a market system, there is competition between individual producers
and also competition among contractual forms people use to enforce
agreement.
The demand for privatization of assets in Russia reflected the
widespread recognition that political control of economic activity
provided perverse incentives and distorted information. The absence of
markets impeded the movement of resources to higher value uses.
Political decision makers who bore none of the financial consequences
for their decisions could pursue private agendas without accountability
for costs.  If their goal was maximization of political power, then this
goal might be served by establishing bureaucratic regulations controlling
all rights of access--access to entry, access to foreign markets, access to
scarce, underpriced supplies, and, ultimately, access to positions in a
regulatory hierarchy that allowed the decision-maker to give benefits to
some constituencies and to hold other groups hostage.
Privatization in the Russian Far East
Privatization in the RFE, as elsewhere, was carried out in
accordance with the established program of the Russian Federation.  The
federal privatization agency, Gosudarstvennyi komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii
po upravleniiu gosudarstvennym imushchestvom--or Goskomimushchestvo
RF, operated through a network of agencies in each territory and
municipality.  Privatization committees at each level prepared and19
submitted privatization projects for approval by their higher-level agency,
by territorial officials, and by the legislature.  When approval was given,
they carried out the formal privatization.
In practice, there was intense political pressure for control of
valuable assets and, not surprisingly, there were many violations of the
formal rules.11  The determination of whether individual production
units would be privatized as separate enterprises or as subsidiaries in a
larger structure was also negotiated on political, not economic, grounds.
Managers of a plant could sometimes buy their independence by agreeing
to assign a share of the commercialized firm's stock to a holding
company controlled by higher level officials.
Small scale privatization of firms in retail trade, public food
services, consumer services, and light industry proceeded rapidly.  By
1995, the services sectors comprised a mixture of units--privatized state
enterprises, new private firms, and municipal firms.  About three-
quarters of these small service firms had been privatized by commercial
bidding, a process in which bidders agreed to meet a set of formal
requirements.  Bidders agreed to continue the same profile of services
after privatization, to guarantee jobs for existing workers, commit to
improvements and repairs, and agree to acquire new machinery and
equipment.  In the case of small-scale services privatization provided a
basis for genuine competition.
[Insert Table:  Privatization of Firms in Trade and Services]
                                    
11  An official who was responsible for privatization of municipal assets in Vladivostok
argued that  the most valuable city  property was withdrawn from privatization when it
emerged  that the local committee could not be influenced.  (Inverview, October, 1995,
Seattle.)20
Voucher privatization of large-scale firms proceeded more slowly in
the Far East than in other regions because of the large share of firms
providing infrastructure services and producing military products.
Nevertheless, by 1994, in two-thirds of the firms, employees had opted for
the so-called second variant of privatization which allowed employees to
acquire 51 percent of the voting stock of their firms, bidding with
vouchers.
The relative roles of the federal and territorial levels of
governments may be inferred from a 1995 report of the process in
Khabarovsk:
Large blocks of stock (15 - 51% of authorized capital) were assigned
to state ownership during the privatization of 259 enterprises. This
stock is being managed by:
• The Russian Federation State Property Management Committee
(3,443,910 shares valued at 1,783 million rubles and 1 "golden"
share),
• The Khabarovskiy Kray State Property Management Committee
(1,528,744 shares at  916 million rubles and 10 "golden"
shares),
• The Khabarovskiy Kray Property Fund (later subordinate to the
Property Management Committee)
(1,457,180 shares worth 754 million rubles.)12
Although enterprise ownership was widely dispersed at the end of
the first stage of privatization, it became more concentrated at the
second stage when large blocks of the remaining shares were sold for
rubles.  By 1995, most of the large firms in the region were under hybrid
ownership with shares of stocks held by employees, managers, members
of the territorial elite, outside owners, and the state.  In most cases,
                                    
12  Economic Life in the Russian Far East, "Privatization in Khabarovskiy Kray:
Statistics for 1992-94 and plans for 1995," 4 June 1995.21
ownership was initially exercised by inside owners, consisting of
enterprise managers and territorial elite, but, gradually, outside investors
began to acquire shares of stock in firms with valuable export products
from employees who were selling their shares in the secondary market.
One local observer, Pavel Minakir, of the Institute for Economic
Research of the Academy of Sciences in Khabarovsk is critical of the
resulting concentration of ownership.  He writes:13
The initial redistribution of property for privatization checks
has been virtually completed...In reality, for the majority of the
population, the stocks acquired in exchange for vouchers have
little value, amounting only to a few shares of stock.  The real
goal, which was achieved, was to create the formal conditions
whereby citizens could independently, without later accusing the
government of squandering public property, redistribute ownership
of the means of production to the "new Russians," who for some
reason came to be called the "new" owners.  In fact, these are the
old owners.  But now there is a process (far more simplified and
accelerated than the voucher privatization) of transforming the
property of the political elite (nomenklatura) into juridical
property.
In sum, then, privatization succeeded in creating conditions for
competitive markets in small-scale retail and service industries, but in
large-scale industry, privatization created hybrid firms which were
nominally owned by several groups of stockholders, but which, in reality,
were controlled by insiders.
Since the end of formal privatization, outside strategic investors
have attempted to acquire control of the most valuable firms through
purchase of shares, through investment, and through various
administrative arrangements.  Control of state-owned enterprises
remains in contention as well.  For example, the Khabarovsk
                                    
13  Pavel Minakir and Gregory Freeze.  The Russian Far East: An Econoomic Survey.
Khab arovsk, "RIOTIP" 1996.22
administration protested when federal authorities attempted to make the
Gagarin aircraft factory in Komsomolsk-na-Amure a subsidiary of the
Sukhoi Design Bureau in Moscow.  In the case of firms in raw materials
industries, the ultimate structure of industry ownership probably will be
shaped by politically-defined rules for access to resources and by
administrative control of access to the foreign market and availability of
subsidized government investment.
The Creation of a Tax-Based State
Providing the legal infrastructure to support private ownership of
enterprises and assets means a changed role for the state as well.
Within the command framework of the former Soviet Union, the state--
or, specifically, the industrial Ministry--exercised the control rights to
enterprises and assets, while the cash flow rights were supposed to be
centralized in the treasury and spent for the benefit of the population.
In the reform economy, a separation of government revenue from
ownership of capital provides greater transparency in both the capital
market and the public sector.  Government taxes and subsidies become
explicit in the government budget rather than implicit in government
prices and allocations.  While the central function of the Soviet state
was control of economic activity, then the central functions of a market-
oriented state are the provision of institutional infrastructure for civil
society and markets, social insurance, and public goods.
The importance of publicly-owned natural resources and land in
the stock of wealth of Russia impedes attempts to change the role of the
state from control of wealth to provision of institutions.  However, the
privatization of firms in the resource extraction industries which receive23
control of resource stocks from government authorities creates the
opportunity for private producers to transfer the income from resources
away from the nominal owner, the state, to the private producers.  Since
access to resources is valuable, there are incentives for state allocators
to create arrangements which are opaque and provide incentives for
corruption.  Although more than half of Russia's export revenue
originates from energy and raw materials, natural resource changes
provided about 2.6 percent of government budgetary revenue, or 4.9
percent of tax revenue in 1995.   In the Russian Far East, natural
resources charges provided 5.6 of total budget income, or 8.8 percent of
tax revenue.
[Insert Table:  Tax Revenues from Resources]
A 1998 IMF working paper by Dale F. Gray evaluates potential and
actual tax revenues from oil and gas in Russia and the other countries of
the former Soviet Union.  Gray finds that government oil and gas
revenues are about half the level prevailing in other energy producers in
the world.  Gray attributes low oil revenues to constraints on export
policy, inappropriate tax structures, and weak tax administration.  Law
gas revenues are due to low statutory tax rates, a tax structure that fails
to capture resource rents, and weak tax administration.14
In 1996, total tax revenue from the oil sector equaled 2.32 percent
of total GDP.  Taxation of oil relied on several production-based levies.
There is a differentiated wellhead excise tax payable on each ton of
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production, averaging 70,000 old rubles per ton ($14) in 1996.  Royalties
of 6 to 16 percent and a Geology Fund tax of 10 percent are placed on
the value of wellhead production.  There are several other extra-budget
fees in addition to profits tax and VAT.
Tax revenues from the gas sector are collected mainly in the form
of an excise tax of 30 percent on the wholesale value of delivered gas.  In
addition, there is a royalty of 6 to 16 percent, a Geology Fund levy of 10
percent (based on the wellhead value of gas).  Export duties were
eliminated in 1996.  There are also property taxes with a maximum of 2
percent on net book value of assets and several smaller taxes.  Profits tax
and VAT tax are also collected.  In 1996, the sum of these taxes provided
government revenue equal to 2.05 percent of GDP.15
Actual tax revenues collected on energy are about 50 to 66 percent
of statutory levels because of exemptions, noncompliance, and arrears.
Compared with other countries, a large share of the natural resource
rents accrue to the transport monopolies, Gasprom and Transneft,
relatively little of which is passed on to the government budget.
Thus, in the resource industries, although notional ownership is
public, much of the potential rent is transferred to producers who gain
control rights to resources.  Access rights are acquired in a relationship
system linking industrial leaders and political authorities.  To see how
the relationship system works, we now turn to three case studies:  the
Chukotka region, the forest products industry, and the fishing industry.
Rights to Timber Resources
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In the Russian Far East, the management of forest resources
differs from other resources in that, with economic reform, management
of the forest was assigned to the territorial governments.
 Yet, in spite of an initial decentralization, the competition for control of
assets has been no less fierce.  By 1998, there has been a considerable
recentralization of authority in the industry based on control of
regulations, of exports, and of access to investment.  Behind the
appearance of a decentralized privatization, there has actually been the
re-establishment of the old elite of the Ministry of Forestry in a quasi-
privatized industry.  This group of former officials appears to have
enjoyed a considerable share of the rents that accrued to the nominally
state-owned forests.  For example, in Khabarovskiy krai, out of total
consolidated taxes paid into the government budget of 4483.1 billion
(old) rubles in 1996, only 87.3 million, less than 2 percent, came from
resource payments.16
During the Soviet era, activity in the forest sector was coordinated
by the Ministry of Forestry.  The Ministry, itself, was divided into two
branches, the Forest Service, or Minleskhoz, which was responsible for
forest protection, and the Forest Products Industry, or Minlesprom,
which harvested and processed timber.  With cutting and replanting
under two separate organizations, Minlesprom had no incentives to alter
harvest technique in order to foster re-growth.  The Forest Service was
also dependent on a portion of Minlesprom's profits for its budget, so it
was unlikely to oppose Minlesprom's access to a site.  Moreover, the
Forest Service was allowed to conduct "sanitary" harvest of over-mature
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wood in protected areas to supplement it's own budget, so it undertook
logging precisely in protected areas.
Despite the problems, Russian Far East timber exports were a
fungible commodity used to pay for imports of equipment in the region's
trade with Japan.  The exchange of wood for machinery was carried out
under bilateral general agreements b et ween the Soviet Union and
Japan.  In the Soviet era, there were five agreements:  four on forest
products, and one on the construction of the first phase of the port of
Vostochnyi.  In these agreements, the Soviet government received credits
from the Export-Import Bank of Japan for the purchase of Japanese
equipment.  Payment was made in kind with raw materials.  Three
agreements were still in force at the end of 1991:  an agreement on wood
chips, one on the development of the Sakha coal fields, and a joint
feasibility study of Sakhalin oil and gas.  Today, long-term agreements
for forest products have lapsed because of continuing problems with
quality and delivery, but the RFE continues to send more than 80
percent of its reported timber export to Japan.
With the start of reform, a new law, the Fundamental Forestry Law
of the Russian Federation, was passed in March, 1993.17  The new law
appeared to give territorial and district officials unprecedented authority
over forest management.18  Districts were to have rights to sell timber,
allocate rights to log, and monitor compliance, authority which had been
in the hands of federal and territorial officials earlier.  A new procedure
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was introduced.  There was to be a license guaranteeing long term leasing
rights, although this right would not relieve the user of the requirement
to obtain an annual permit as well.  Access to forest sites was to be
distributed by bidding, by competition (a non-monetary form of bidding),
or through direct negotiations.  In practice, territorial governors were
able to assert authority to control resource stocks and an enlarged,
multi-level bureaucracy emerged to allocate timber land assignments.
In December, 1992, the Property Committee of the Russian
Federation created a hybrid joint stock company, Roslesprom, which was
partly state and partly privately owned.  It was to allocate federal
investment funding among regions, to fund research, and to manage
access of firms to the export market.  "In reality," write scientists,
Vladimir Karakin, Alexander Sheingauz, and Vladimir Tyukalov,
"Roslesprom [was] attempting to gain control over the Russian
Federation forest industry, including those in the RFE."19
Roslesprom received authority to exercise state-owned shares in all
joint stock companies in the forest industry and the right to manage all
state-owned assets.  The federal government gave Roslesprom the right to
distribute 150 billion rubles in government credit at 10 percent interest
(when inflation was almost 1000 percent).  Credits were, in fact,
distributed exclusively to Roslesprom holdings.
In 1994-95, Roslesprom established fifty local holding companies,
based on the former territorial associations of the Ministry of Forest
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Industry.   It named its own appointees to head these companies, to
supervise production, and to collect data on all export contracts.20  The
entire foreign network of the former forest products exporting
organization, Exportles, was transferred to Roslesprom.  In addition, it
established a separate exporting organization, Rosexportles, holding 96
percent of its stock.  It also became co-owner of the National Forest
Bank and the Russian Forest Investment Company, incorporated in
Boston.21  Export licenses and access to export were managed through a
few large former Ministry units.
During this period when the former ministerial units were
attempting to re-establish control of the industry from above, a
decentralized private sector was emerging in the regions, in the form of
privatized firms, production cooperatives, and other small businesses.
However, many of the small businesses that were set up by territorial
and district elites, served to transfer revenues away from existing state-
owned or newly privatized firms, leaving the established firms burdened
with the production cots.
In Khabarovskiy krai, privatization of the 82 timber harvesters, 14
saw mills, 12 furniture factories, 10 pulp and paper plants, and various
repair shops created a population of about 150 private or partly private
forest sector firms controlling over 90 percent of output.  However, state
shares, and, thus, control rights over these nominally private firms
remained in government hands.
After the first phase of privatization, controlling interests in firms
were divided between the territorial administration and a Financial
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Industrial Group (FIG) led by a regional association and marketing
organization, Dallesprom.  In an exchange of shares in 1995, Dallesprom
gas the territorial administration shares representing a 51 percent
controlling interest in its capital.  in turn, Dallesprom received a
controlling interest in forest harvesting companies managed by the
state.22  Similar territorial FIGs formed in other regions of the RFE.
In 1995, state shares in privatized firms were to be sold on the
stock market for rubles.  However, fearing loss of control to outside
owners, territorial administrators devised a number of administrative
strategies to retain local control.  The number of firms was increased and
rights to harvest were redistributed to them.  In 1996, Dallesprom
established a joint venture with US Caterpillar Company to sell and
service Caterpillar equipment to the region's firms.23
Meanwhile, in Moscow, control of export was weakened when the
federal system of export quotas and strategic exporters was abolished in
1994, although government approval of export contracts was still
required.24  But, in 1996, Roslesprom's position was bolstered with the
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the US Ex-Im Bank at
the sixth session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.  According to
that document, the Ex-Im Bank provides credit guarantees for loans
issued by US commercial banks to Russian forest industry firms.  1996
credit guarantees of up to $1 billion were agreed.  Russian loan
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recipients are required to sell timber to foreign firms which must deposit
revenues directly into an offshore escrow account.
The latest chapter in this administrative shell game is recounted in
the Moscow Interfax Foreign Trade Report and in Russian Far East
Update.25  After President Yeltsin ordered the privatization of Roslesprom
in August, 1997, the two Moscow banks which financed timber exports,
Mezhkombank and Imperial Bank, split the export contracts and
operations of Roslesprom's export subsidiary, Rosexportles.  They created
two new companies with similar names, leaving Roslesprom with few
assets and multibillion-ruble debts.  Presumably, there is little left to
privatize today.
In sum, then, in spite of its nominal privatization, the Russian
forest products industry remains in the hands of insider elites who
control access to stands of timber, to investment and credit, and access
to the export market.  Potential foreign partners, such as US
Weyerhauser, which explored a joint venture with a timber producer in
Khabarovskiy krai, backed off when they discovered that basic
parameters, such as the rights to a forest site and the right to export
could evaporate at the whim of the authorities.
Neither the Soviet Ministry of Forestry nor its quasi-privatized
progeny had incentives to re-forest accessible areas or to develop
sustainable yield practices.  Timber stocks are treated like a free good, for
much of the downed timber never reaches a final market.  Regional
production of timber has been falling steadily, particularly after reform
as the price of fuel and transport have risen toward market levels.
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The Russian Federal Forestry Service, nominally responsible for re-
forestation, has a miniscule budget, now in arrears.  As in the Soviet era,
it still has the right to conduct "sanitary" harvests in protected areas.
 Unable to serve the European market because of high transport
costs, local producers have turned to the Pacific.  Here, Dallesprom
attempts to regulate, not the amount of timber that is brought to
market, but the selling price, by establishing minimum allowable prices.
However, the quality of timber, and, thus, its market price, is so variable
that effective regulation is next to impossible.  In the recent past, the
Russian timber industry has flooded the Pacific market with wood,
depressing prices.  Thus, the RFE forest resource is likely to provide little
long-run support for the region's recovery.
[Insert: RFE Timber Production]
Rights to Fishery Resources
The long-run prospects of the Pacific fishery are somewhat better.
Administration of the Soviet fishery was always centralized.  The
administrative structure was the familiar ministerial hierarchy of the
Soviet Ministry of Fisheries.  At the top were the Minister and his
deputies.  At the bottom were the production associations, firms, and
collectives in each coastal territory.  In between were two levels of
administration.  Below the top were the regional maritime basin
administrative organs, such as Dal'ryba, in the Russian Far East; then,
below Dal'ryba were the regional fishing councils of each territory
(oblast, krai, okrug) within the region.  Thus, the Ministry of Fisheries in
Moscow controlled the harvest and processing of marine products.32
At the same time, the Ministry controlled another, scientific
hierarchy which was responsible for overseeing the conservation and
sustainable development of resources, the policies that were supposed to
preserve the value of Russia's marine resources.   This hierarchy was
headed by the All Soviet Fisheries Oceanographic Research Institute
(VNIRO) in Moscow and included territorial research centers, such as
TINRO, in most of the RFE territories.  Investment and renewal of the
fishing fleet and other capital facilities was managed by still another
vertical chain of command in the Ministry.
With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, a much smaller
Russian Ministry of Fisheries was, initially, transferred to the Ministry of
Agriculture and, then, re-established as an independent agency until
1997 when it, again, was placed under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture
Ministry.
A law passed by the Russian Supreme Soviet on December 27,
1991, reaffirmed that "natural resources within the territorial waters,
exclusive economic zones, and continental shelf of the Russian
Federation" remained the exclusive property of the Russian Federation
government.26  However, in 1990, many of Dal'ryba's management
functions were decentralized to short-lived Basin Production
Organizations. Beginning in mid-1991, as central authority collapsed,
territorial governments took charge of quotas for harvesting marine
resources, selling the rights to domestic and foreign harvesters.  In 1992,
the export of fish reached unprecedented levels, accounting for 50
percent of the catch, leading to a drastic reduction in domestic supply.
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In response, in 1992, a system of scientific-industrial councils was
established to oversee management of the fishery resource and to make
recommendations to the Federal Fisheries Committee.  The Far East
Scientific-Fishing Industry Council includes representatives of the
Federal Fisheries Committee, Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources, scientific research organization, fish enforcement agencies
(Glavryb), territorial councils, the fishing industry, and the territorial
administrations.  Within each territory, there is a territorial fishing
industry council, appointed by the territorial government as a joint
organization of the Federal Fisheries Committee and the regional
government. This local organization was to "develop recommendations to
the territorial administration" on allocation of regional fishing quotas,
fisheries regulations, territorial funding of fishing industry interests,
licensing of fishing, etc.27  (It, however, does not have authority to assign
allocations.)  The accompanying diagram depicts the several
administrative, scientific, and enforcement agencies involved in
regulating the RFE fishery during the 90s.  The outline is based on a
diagram in Clarence Pautzke, North Pacific Fishery Management Council
Report to Congress, September 30, 1997 (with the addition of the Border
Guard, which acquired a larger enforcement role from Glavrybvod
(Moscow) at the beginning of 1998.
[Insert Diagram]
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Far East fishing organizations were enormous in size.  For
example, BAMR, Marine Fisheries Base in Nakhodka controlled a huge
fishing port, a ship repair yard, construction organizations, apartment
buildings, and social overhead facilities.  It employed more that 13,000
people.  Despite (or, perhaps, because of) their size, fishing associations
were inefficient.  Fleets faced bureaucratic regulations and excessive time
in port.  Fuel supply was uncertain.  Fleets, ports, and repair yards had
insufficient, aging technology.
As a result of privatization, the state organization, Dal'ryba and
its sub-units became joint stock companies and most of the territorial
production associations became independent commercial fishing
enterprises.  Some of these became joint stock companies and others
remained state enterprises.  However, the independent firms continued to
participate as members of territorial associations in lobbying for access
to quotas.  Similarly, fishing cooperatives formed regional unions to
represent their interests.  The functions of Dal'ryba itself were redefined,
allowing it to conclude contracts with producers, to oversee
implementation of state orders and research, to set quotas, search out
new stocks, and represent the interests of producers vis a vis the state.28
After privatization, the new Dal'ryba included 54 organizations--
some 40 state and private joint stock companies, four territorial unions
of collectives, three limited liability partnerships, three joint ventures,
and four state firms.29  These organizations managed a large, but aging
fleet of almost 1000 fishing ships, many of them big (3,500-6,000 ton)
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trawlers which engaged in open-sea expeditions using large fish-
processing "mother ships" supplied by a fleet of smaller seiners or
trawlers.  However, most vessels in the Russian fleet had poor fuel
efficiency, outmoded instrumentation, and were expensive to operate
under market conditions.
Since privatization, access to fish in the Russian 200-mile zone
has been based on contracts, or quotas.  Access of Japanese ships is
negotiated annually in a government-to-government agreement.
Domestic allocations are determined in an administrative process.
Rights are supposed to reflect the size of a firm or region's past catch,
but lobbying and side-payments are reported to play a role as well.  The
Russian Federal Committee on Fisheries gives itself an allocation.
Territorial governments receive separate quotas.  Some, like Chukotka,
have established commercial firms to exercise their quotas.  Others re-
sell their fishing rights to domestic or foreign bidders.
Today, joint ventures give Russian partners access to Western
technology and capital markets, giving Western partners access to deep-
sea processors, initially, and, later, access to the Russian fishery.
The earliest Soviet-US joint venture, Marine Resources, was incorporated
in the US in 1978, after establishment of the 200-mile fishing zone. A
partnership between Bellingham Cold Storage and Sovrybflot, the
commercial arm of the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries, it fished in US
waters, using leased Russian processors and American fishing boats and
marketing the product internationally.  After passage of the Soviet joint
venture law in 1987, fishery joint ventures were established with partners36
in Japan, the US, South Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, and Vietnam.30
At present, there are more than 100 Russian fishing joint ventures,
including more than 30 with Japan.
Russian firms with access to the Western capital market have been
able to retrofit their ships with fuel efficient engines and state of the art
technology.  Firms acquired new supertrawlers, which can both catch
and process fish, through leasing arrangements with Western shipyards,
funded by Western banks.
However, in spite of the rising technical efficiency of the Russian
fleet, reported catch has declined steadily from its reported peak in 1988,
and the share of high-value products, such as salmon and crab, has
fallen.
[Insert Table:  Fish and Seafood Production]
In part, the decline in production reflects overfishing--a
consequence of high quotas and illegal fishing.  In part, the decline in
measured production reflects a growing volume of Russian catch which is
delivered offshore, going unrecorded by Russian customs authorities.
(Japanese trade statistics report roughly 50 percent higher landings than
Russian data.)  In response, Russian fishing companies respond that
high taxes, informal payments, and operating costs, frequent non-
payment and arrears on the part of customers all make it unprofitable to
sell in the Russian market.
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In 1997, concern over under-reporting led to tighter enforcement.
In May, 1997, the federal government intervened in Primore, appointing
Viktor Kondratov, head of the local office of the Federal Security Service,
as President's Representative.  President Yeltsin transferred budget
authority and the authority to approve the allocation of quotas for
commercial fish, seafood, and timber from the governor, Evgenii
Nazdratenko, to Kondratov.  On January 1, 1998, the primary
responsibility for monitoring and enforcement of fishing quotas was to be
transferred from the Moscow enforcement arm, Glavrybvod, to the Border
Guard.  (So far, this process seems to be moving slowly.)
Members of the industry question whether the Border Guard will,
in fact, provide more effective enforcement.  That organization, too, faces
wage and payment arrears from the federal government.  Sources in the
fishing industry report incidents of theft of catch and other forms of
"hold-up" involving individuals in the Border Guard.31
In 1998, in spite of high production and technical modernization,
the formal accounts of Russian fishing organizations imply that many
are "drowning."  Several are bankrupt or in receivership after defaulting
on high fixed lease payments.  In 1997, fishery scientist Vlad M.
Kasczynski reported that, out of 65 new and 19 reconditioned fishing
vessels delivered to Russia under leasing arrangements with Western
shipyards, 30 ships were in default on Western bank loans totaling $71.8
millions.32
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One of the larger Russian companies, Vladivostok Base of Trawling
and Refrigeration Fleet, ceased operation in January, 1998.  This firm,
which was owned, in part, by Dal'morproduct, the commercial arm of the
Russian Fishing Committee, had received Russian government
guarantees for its bareboat lease payments on 12 Spanish-built trawlers.
Russian Far East Update reports that the 12 trawlers will be operated by
a new joint stock company, Super of Vladivostok, which has received
"generous quotas" for 1998.33  Chesterton Investments, Cayman Islands,
which formerly marketed VBTF's product, is one of the companies that
will market Super's catch.
In sum, then, the interlinked state-commercial networks that
provide access to the Russian pacific fishery present a mixed picture.  On
the one hand, the establishment of firms and joint ventures offshore
allows the industry to modernize its capital stock, something that is not
happening in other industries.  Activities which appear unprofitable in
Russian accounts may, in fact, be rewarding for insiders in the industry
and the government, but at the expense of transparency.  Measured as a
share of the value of the total harvest, government budgetary revenue,
either at the center or in the region, appears modest, although territories
may be deriving in-kind benefits as well.  Rates of harvest appear to be
drawing down stocks.  The process of gaining access to quotas is likely to
generate corruption both in the region and at the center.
In August, 1998, the Russian Fisheries Ministry announced a draft
government resolution, which would provide that, in the future, 15-20
percent of allowable catch of certain valuable species, such as salmon,
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sturgeon, and crab, would be offered to the highest bidder at regional
auctions.  They promised to consult the statistics of trading partners to
monitor illegal export of fish.  Industry observers countered that changes
which gave allocators a better measure of the true value of access might
increase, rather than reduce, corruption.  Clearly, an annual auction
would provide less incentive to undertake specialized investment than
would a procedure involving the auction of a license or long-term right to
access.
To the specialist in resources, there are a variety of ways in which
a public decision-maker could try to manage the coastal fishery in order
to limit overfishing, foster sustainable development, collect some share
of the resource rents into the central or regional budget, and reduce the
incentives for corruption or evasion.  These mechanisms could include
taxes on resources, taxes on fishing effort, imposition of quotas on
aggregate catch, and individual quotas.
In the Soviet-era, the Ministry of Fisheries allocated regional and
local access to resources politically, assigning control to corresponding
stocks of fishing ships through a political process.  With domestic prices
of fish products, ships and equipment, and fuel all very far from world
prices, attempts to estimate underlying input efficiencies or desirable
long-run rates of harvest must have been difficult.  Opportunities for
corruption in the sale of underpriced caviar and crab on the world
market must have been great.
Today, the existing administrative framework for limiting access
and assigning quotas needs to be converted from an opaque lobbying
process to the transparent sale (and enforcement) of limited rights to
fish.  The experience of the US North Pacific Fisheries Management40
Council in creating a market for fishing licenses is far from ideal, but it
is preferable to the pattern of corruption and criminalization of access
rights which is emerging in the Russian Far East.
Chukotskaya Autonomous Okrug
Passengers on Alaska Airlines flights from Anchorage to the
Russian Far East sometimes stop briefly in Chukotka when their flight
lands for fuel at a military airbase outside Anadyr.  When my flight
arrived at that bleak outpost in the summer of 1994, the acres of
barracks in the desolate landscape appeared totally empty until, finally,
a jeep and a gasoline truck approached.  A young woman in a quilted
cotton jacket dragged a hose from the truck to refill the airplane while
the driver of the truck lounged next to it, smoking a cigarette.  While the
tank was filling, the young woman disappeared into a depression in the
field, returning with a bouquet of wildflowers for the crew.  In the
meantime, the young officer of the Border Guard stationed at the door of
the plane reminisced about his hometown, St. Petersburg, with Russian-
speaking passengers.
During the nine-hour wait for a Custom's official imposed on us by
the local military, I saw only one decrepit, propeller aircraft arrive and
depart the airfield and a single truck arrive from the ferry crossing with
the town of Anadyr.  It seemed as if Russian power had abandoned its
Siberian North, leaving it in the hands of a few ill-fed and poorly-clad
caretakers.
Tiny Chukotka's regional finances reflect the complicated economic
relationship with Moscow of a region which is still largely government
owned and subsidized.  In the Soviet era, the region, a desolate41
landscape of tundra in the Far North, was a district of Magadan.  In
1992, the Russian parliament gave it independent status.  In that year,
total population, much of it military, was 124,000 (down from 155,000 in
1991).34   There were a reported 70,500 in the labor force.  Three years
later, in 1995, reported population had fallen to 91,000;  total
employment was 45,500.35  Small as they are, these figures probably are
a considerable overstatement of actual economic activity in the region.
The region's non-ferrous mining (tin and gold), its electric power network
(including the aging nuclear power station Bilibino), its coal mines and
fishing collectives employ fewer than 8,000 in the official economy.
Pevek (13,000) is its main Arctic port, serving a tin and gold mining
region.  Anadyr (17,000), its administrative center, once served a network
of bases that are largely unoccupied today.  However, accurate depiction
of their state could add to Russia's vulnerability in the Pacific.
Nevertheless, in 1997, Chukotka's industrial output was a reported
1.384 trillion rubles, or 15.8 million rubles per capita for each of its
87,000 residents.  The July, 1997 issue of Russian Far East Update and
interviews with a representative of the regional government provide some
of the detail.36  Aside from local gold production, which totaled 11,426
kg. in 1994, tin mining, and production of local coal, Chukotka is
maintained by the federal government using in-kind support plus a line
item in the federal budget.
                                    
34  Gosudarstvennyi komitet possiiskoi federatsii po statistike., Osnovnye polazateli
sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo polozheniia i khoda ekonomicheskoi reformy v regionakh
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36  This section is  based on:  Elisa Miller, editor, Russian Far East Update, July 1997,
pp. 7-10 and interviews with Alexander Karp, a representative of Polar Pacific, Seattle,
Wasington February, 1998.42
In-kind support includes a fishing quota from the State Fisheries
Committee and export rights for oil.  In 1995, the regional leadership
created the Chukotka Fishing Company, when the company bought a
large Russian-built trawler-processor.  Shareholders of the firm were the
Chukotka Trading Company, the Development Fund of Chukotka, the
Association of Indigenous Peoples of Chukota, and the Far Eastern
Investment Company (Moscow), a company managed by the regional
authorities.
In 1996, the State Fisheries Committee granted the Chukotka
Fishing Company a quota of 50,000 metric tons, although only 25,000
tons of fish were actually caught.  Almost two-thirds of that catch was
caught by a large trawler-processor managed by Alaska Ocean of
Anacortes, Wa. on a profit-sharing basis.  In 1997, the quota was 60,000
tons of fish, including 1000 metric tons of crab.  Revenues from fishing
go into the Development Fund of Chukotka, managed by the Committee
on Northern Affairs and Indigenous Peoples, headed by the governor.
In addition, in 1997, Moscow gave Chukotka the right to export up
to 1 million metric tons of crude oil per year to Western Europe, exempt
from excise taxes.  Far Eastern Investment Company invests the
proceeds of those exports until they are needed for regional imports of
fuel.  (The region has a small local on-shore oil field and hopes to build a
refinery to produce about 50,000 metric tons of fuel annually.)  Far
Eastern Investment Company has a seat on the Moscow Stock Exchange
and a portfolio of Russian investments.
Thirdly, Chukotka receives a line item in the federal budget equal
to about $100,000 per year to cover the region's annual provisioning.
(About $1150 per capita.)  However, since federal subsidies are usually43
much delayed, the region has had to borrow the money to pay for
provisioning, using its oil receipts as collateral.
Chukotka Trading Company is the purchasing arm of the
administration.  It handles about $100,000 in turnover annually,
importing food, coal, and mining machinery.  Last year it bought a fish
processing plant.  It also holds rights to develop the offshore oil deposits
in the Chukotka Sea.  Chukotka companies are managed from Moscow
because most of its payments---payments to gold producers, subsidies for
provisioning, and oil export rights---originate in Moscow.
The administrative arrangements for managing Russia's Siberian
North have certain features in common with arrangements in the US
state of Alaska.  The US military and other federal agencies, such as the
Department of the Interior's agencies providing services to Native
American communities, are run from thousands of miles away.  Although
the Alaskan native communities are the titular owners of vast tracts of
land, local communities have little direct influence on the amount and
direction of spending.  Yet, in the American case, mechanisms to provide
accountability are in place to document and monitor revenues,
expenditures, and costs.  In the case of the Russian institutional
arrangements, such mechanisms have yet to be established.  Until such
mechanisms are in place, there is scant information to determine
whether federally-allocated rights to resources are used for regional
subsidies or for private wealth.
Crony Capitalism and Resource Management44
In 1998, with formal privatization almost complete, the legal
foundations for exercise of property rights and the mechanisms of
resource management and corporate governance fall far short of the
arrangements required to introduce genuine competitive markets.
Russia's Duma continues to oppose the establishment of full, legal
private property rights in agricultural and urban land.  They continue to
impose numerous restrictions in legislation presented to them.  Without
land ownership, private firms are unable to use their plant and
equipment as collateral for loans or to purchase and sell the full rights
to a business.
The rights to resource stocks and resource sites are government
property, administered by a number of government agencies.  These
agencies have formal procedures for acquiring rights to resources, but, in
practice, the rights are subject to frequent revision and to the risk of
holdup.  Firms attempt to gain security through participation in
relationship systems, but, with frequent political changes, there are high
risks of having the wrong friends.
For example, the State Minerals Fund is administered by the State
Committee for Geology and Rational Use of Resources (State Geological
Committee.)  The Russian Federation Committee oversees territorial
committees which coordinate the licensing of rights to use mineral
resources in conjunction with the territorial administration and other
government agencies.
The licensing of mining operations is complex and subject to
revision by the Russian regulators.  A mining company obtains a license
by means of an auction, tender, or "competition" (in which performance45
criteria are specified in detail.)  International firms seeking access to
resource stocks must prepare a feasibility study or development plan.37
A license assigns exclusive rights to a resource site together with
the right to use, but not own, the surrounding land.  The license
specifies fees, payments, or product shares and detailed terms of access
and performance.  Fee schedules typically consist of a fixed, initial
payment and a periodic fee.
Western investors seeking access to Russian resources face
multiple constraints.  Precious metals, such as gold, are considered state
property and must be sold to approved institutions within Russia.  Cost
estimates, feasibility studies, and calculation of ore reserves deviate from
industry practice elsewhere in the world.38
In practice, as our case studies suggest, access to resources is
arranged within a complicated relationship system.  Both the territorial
governor and his administration and Russian Federation authorities and
their regional representatives play a role in setting up arrangements.  In
practice, either federal or territorial authorities may block development,
so the firm undertaking a project faces considerable risk of being held
hostage.
In the case of the most valuable export resource, oil, the
restructuring of the industry into eleven vertically integrated production
and refining complexes was carried out at the center between the
Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the State Property Committee, with the
final industry structure validated by presidential decrees.  Initially, the
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new oil giants were holding companies, owning less than half of the
shares of their subsidiaries, but in the second stage of privatization,
influential business leaders acquired controlling shares in several of the
oil majors in a series of shares-for-loans transactions with the Russian
government.  Subsequently, most of the oil-industry holding companies
were integrated into Financial Industrial Groups, or FIGS.  Often
organized around a bank which could turn to international financial
markets to consolidate ownership, the financial barons who controlled
these business groups played a key role in the re-election of Boris Yeltsin
in 1995 and went on to enjoy close insider links to the Russian
government agencies overseeing privatization and regulating production.
The close inter-linking of  Russia's financial oligarchs with
government authorities in the Russian Federation is popularly called
"crony capitalism."  Crony capitalism is a set of administrative
arrangements designed to allow members of a government and political
elite to acquire control rights to assets and to transfer the cash flow
rights to themselves. To the outside observer, this hybrid between
government administration and market competition seems to offer
Russian citizens the worst of both worlds.  The government provides, not
ownership, but access on highly advantageous terms.  The firms, whose
rights to resources are dependent on the maintenance of a system of
political relationships, receive monopoly rights, but enjoy uncertain
tenure, so they have incentives to decapitalize their assets, moving the
proceeds offshore to a lower-risk environment.
In many regions of Russia, the territorial governor operates as a local
baronet managing the territory's resources in the interest of a local elite
and representing local interests in negotiations with the center.47
Relationship systems, originally organized around the Communist
party, played a vital coordinating role in the Soviet economy.  In the
Soviet regions, two firms in the same city but subordinate to different
ministries were unable to trade with each other in input markets.
However, if their directors were part of a local network, then they could
break bottlenecks, resolve disputes, and lobby the center.  Between
themselves, local officials and managers managed to provide some of the
local infrastructure that went unfunded from the center.
Similarly, today's crony capitalism can facilitate barter and
extension of credits in a closed capital market, but it is also the
mechanism for capturing wealth, controlling access to resources and
markets, subsidizing, and redistributing.  Since self-enforcing agreements
work best when access to assets has a high franchise value, crony
capitalism restricts entry.  In the foreign market, restriction of
competition implies protectionist, anti-foreign policies.
[Insert Table:  Crony Capitalism]
The Virtual Economy
The opaque relationships of crony capitalism are played out in a
system which still has much in common with the Soviet era.  In Soviet
plans, there were two monetary circuits.  Industrial producers paid for
raw materials and delivered products in a non-cash system of budgets.
Budgets were debited for purchase, credited for delivery, and any
overdrafts on the cost side were ultimately bailed out by Gosbank.
Workers, on the other hand, received cash rubles to spend in the
consumer market.  Costs had little meaning in this system, since48
activities that served various hidden agendas of enterprise managers were
charged as costs of official activities.
Today, argue Barry Ickes and Clifford Gaddy, there is still a
paternalistic, loss-making sector of value subtractors which survives by
reporting a variety of official activities:
In December 1997 the Inter-Agency Balance-Sheet
Commission of the Russian government reported: "An economy is
emerging where prices are charged which no one pays in cash;
where no one pays anything on time; where huge mutual debts are
created that also can't be paid off in reasonable periods of time;
where wages are declared and not paid.  This creates illusory, or
virtual earnings, which in turn lead to unpaid, or virtual fiscal
obligations, with business conducted at non-market, or virtual
prices."...Russia's virtual economy is based on illusion, or
pretense, about almost every important parameter of the economy;
prices, sales, wages, taxes, and budgets.39
Beneath the surface is an informal economy, operating on the
basis of barter and offset.  Sometimes Russia's new dual economy is a
device for postponing the eventual closure of a bankrupt firm, say Gaddy
and Ickes.  But at other times, with weak corporate governance, the
virtual economy reflects a hidden transfer of income from an official
entity to a private beneficiary.  Robert McIntyre, of the World Institute
for Development Economics Research, cites the Accounting Chamber of
the Russian parliament:40
These privatized companies continued to this day to export
large physical volumes of valuable goods while declaring
themselves unable to pay wages, taxes or input bills at home.  The
new owners of many such industrial and resource production
enterprises secreted the proceeds of foreign sales abroad, deposited
in personal, not corporate accounts.
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Ownership versus Access
Under the institutions of crony capitalism, a harvester gains, not
ownership, but access to resources.  So his/her behavior is are likely to
differ from an owner's behavior.  How would a government which has
sovereign tax power and is the owner of resources maximize its rents?
An owner of resource stocks would invest in resource development and
exploration to the point where the efforts yield the rate of return on
other investment.  He/she should extract resources only if the marginal
net return over variable cost of current extraction equals or exceeds the
present value of expected future returns from not extracting.  These
future returns include the discounted net return from future use of
existing stocks, the productivity of existing stocks in producing future
yield, the effects of stock size on extraction costs, and the possible
benefits derived from enjoying the stock in unharvested form.  Current
extraction may even compete in the manager's program with option
demand--the desire to hold the stock until later in order to have the
option of possible alternative uses.
A government would need a combination of taxes and regulations
to achieve these results.  As the resource owner, the government would
want to ensure that the resource was sold for an appropriate price and
that the rate of extraction was appropriate.  Its tax goal would be to
collect as much economic rent as possible through taxes that did not
distort the incentives facing the harvester.  One such tax would be a
royalty for the right to exploit the deposit.  The government might also
choose to share some of the risk associated with extraction, if this50
reduction of risk led the harvester to reduce the implicit risk premium
that it required from the project.  A production-based tax or production-
sharing arrangement would provide for sharing of risks.
One of the implications of efficient management is that the
majority of resource rents should be captured at the point of production
in a region.  However, in Russia, one goal of the Federation government
is to lower the price received by producers extracting resources in the
regions.  The federal government attempts to centralize the collection of
rents, both to increase its share of the rent and to provide central
control over information as to the size of the rent and the form of its
capture.  There will be a preference for arrangements that conceal
information.
In consequence, resource use under crony capitalism differs from
market ownership in at least three ways.  First, there are significant
"idiosyncratic" costs of maintaining control under crony capitalism.
Second, since central and regional authorities are competing for control
of economic rents, the administrative arrangements will reflect this
strategic interaction. Third, since tenure is insecure, a harvester will
have a shorter time horizon and will attempt to move its portfolio into
less risky assets, probably through capital flight.  During almost seven
years of economic reform, the partial and incomplete reform of rights to
resources has impeded investment, fostered capital flight, and sown the
seeds of conflict between the Federation government and Russia's
regions.
Economic Crisis and Central-Regional Relations51
In the fall of 1998, a new leadership which included Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov, former Soviet Head of Gosplan, Yuri Maslykov, and
former Soviet Central Bank Head, Viktor Gerashchenko promised to re-
ignite Russian inflation, increase the role of the state in the economy,
and  strengthen central control over territories that withheld taxes and
evaded central regulations.
The likely outcome of such plans appears to be increased hardship
for Russia's citizens and continuation of Russia's crony capitalism with
a different group of cronies.  The critical mass of the state is likely to
weigh more heavily in economic outcomes than it did in the past.  A
larger share of the potential rent from resources will be spent in
subsidizing inefficient domestic manufacturers rather than funding
capital flight.  Still, the goal of increased productivity and increased well
being will be unattainable.
The actual delineation of federal, territorial, and regional (raion)
rights to resources will still be in contention as it has been for the past
several years.  Today, all of the territorial governors in the RFE are
elected and exercise considerable authority.  (The exception is Evgenii
Nazdratenko whose budget authority and control over resource
allocations, fishing quotas and logging rights, were transferred by
President Yeltsin to the President's representative, Lt. General Viktor
Kondratov, former Head of the Federal Security Service in the region,
although it is possible that Nazdratenko will regain his authority, as
well, under a new leadership.)
These powerful regional governors are former industrial managers
who profited from the privatization of regional assets in 1992-95 and
who operate within a relationship system that provides some stability at52
a time when the formal rules of the system are contradictory.  Today, as
always, the federal government attempts to pit one region against
another, discouraging their attempts to find a common cause.  Moreover,
it has given autonomous regions, called okrug, independence from the
territories to which they formerly belonged, increasing their dependence
on the center and raising the costs of regional cooperation.
In the individual territories, the parliament has a large number of
members and meets infrequently.  Its legislative authority is exercised by
specific commissions of its members.  Each territory has, in addition, an
appointed President's Representative (already mentioned, above) who is
responsible for coordinating the activities of the many federal authorities
in the territory.  Relations between the Governor and the President's
Representative are often uneasy.
While regional authorities have uncertain rights, they have heavy
responsibilities.  In the former Soviet Union, the individual territories
merely carried out centrally-determined policies, often under the
direction of an industrial Ministry that was dominant in the region.
Moscow maintained its control, in part, through arrangements that set
each region in competition with its neighbors for centrally allocated
resources.  In practice, centralized funding for territorial infrastructure
was always insufficient and territorial and municipal officials had
insufficient authority to provide effective coordination.  So, in practice,
industrial ministries contributed to local infrastructure, coordinating
their efforts through the Communist party.
With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, territorial and
municipal authorities took over the responsibility for providing many
local public goods.  Gradually, a division of tax revenues between the53
territories and the center is emerging to support decentralized supply of
public services.  As of January, 1995, the RFE retained 72 percent of
taxes collected in the region, a larger share than the all-Russian average
of 59 percent.  These shares varied from a low of 61 percent in Primore to
a high of 99.5 percent retained in the Sakha Republic.  Three Northern
territories--Yevreyskaia, Chukotskaia, and Koryakskii autonomous
okrugs received federal subsidies.
[Insert Chart 6:  Share of Taxes Retained in the Regions]
During the years of economic reform, the RFE has steadily lost
population as military activities have decreased and demand for military
products has fallen.  In the future, it is unlikely that resource extraction
alone could underpin the region's economy at the present level, even with
a thriving energy sector.  RFE ports could serve as future nodes for
regional transport infrastructure, but such development would require
major improvement in the physical and institutional infrastructure of
the region.
If a new leadership decides to revitalize the military, this could
stimulate the economies of cities, such as Arsenev, Petropavlovsk, and
Komsomolsk-na-Amure.  Development of Sakhalin's energy would
provide a genuine spur to economic activity, at least during the
investment phase, and availability of low cost fuel would overcome the
energy shortage that has handicapped the region's economy.
Moscow has the means, in its control of quotas, licenses, and
rights to resources to re-centralize control of resources in the region.
Separatist sentiment is unlikely to be strong in the RFE region, given the54
society's sensitivity to a population of over 100 million Chinese on its
border.  A more likely response to Moscow's capture of resource rents
would be increased rule-breaking and evasion.
To balance the pressures from a dominating center and from
powerful neighbors, the regional leaders might seek to build trade and
investment links with more distant countries, such as the US and
Europe.  Yet, that goal of increased investment will be slowed by recent
financial crisis.
Both Russia and the RFE region's interest would be best served by
a dynamic, prosperous Pacific region, but, even with the most favorable
scenario for expansion of energy production, it will still be difficult for
the RFE to achieve that prosperity.